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Abstract: 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are one of the best ever 
growing areas of research. By providing communications in 
the absence of fixed infrastructure MANETs are an attractive 
technology. However this edibility introduces new security 
threats. The traditional way of protecting networks is not 
directly applicable to MANETs. Many conventional security 
solutions are ineffective and inefficient for the highly dynamic 
and resource-constrained environments where MANET use 
might be expected.  In this paper we solving security issue in 
Mobile Adhoc Network using Evolutionary Computation that 
will be discover complex properties of mobile ad hoc 
networks and evolve intrusion detection programs suitable for 
this new environment. Programs evolved using Grammatical 
Evolution techniques which is part of Evolutionary 
Computation, will be able to detect specific routing attacks on 
mobile ad hoc networks. 
Keywords: Mobile Adhoc Network, AODV, NS2. 
1.  INTRODUCTION: 
Intrusion is set of actions that attempt to compromise the 
integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a resource and an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system for the detection 
of such intrusions. There are three main intrusion detection 
techniques working in the literature anomaly-based, misuse 
based, and specification based. All intrusion techniques have 
their own strengths and weaknesses. One of the most 
commonly proposed intrusion detection techniques in 
MANETs is specification-based intrusion detection, where 
intrusions are detected as runtime violations of the 
specifications of routing protocols. This technique has been 
applied to a variety of routing protocols in MANETs. 
2.  PROBLEM STATEMENT: 
Evolutionary computation has already showed considerable 
promise for creating IDS components for conventional 
networks, but has seen very little application in the MANET 
domain. Accordingly, we propose to investigate its potential 
in the new area. The  
main issue we consider in this paper is that Evolutionary 
Computation will be able to discover complex properties  
of mobile ad hoc networks and evolve intrusion detection 
programs suitable for this new environment. Programs  
evolved using Genetic Programming and Grammatical 
Evolution techniques will be able to detect specific routing 
attacks on mobile ad hoc networks (namely ad  
hoc flooding, route disruption, and dropping attacks) 
effectively. 
3.  EVOLUTION OF IDS IN MANETs: 
Here we are going to show the Evolution of IDS using 
evolutionary computation techniques like Grammatical 
Evolution (GE).Before considering the evolution computation 
technique we first focus on  collaborative routing protocols 
(AODV) as an exemplar protocol for in this paper. 
3.1  Ad-Hoc On Demand Routing Protocol 
(AODV):  
This paper the Ad hoc On-Demand Vector routing protocol is 
employed. Operations of AODV described in order to allow a 
better understanding of the routing attacks. AODV is a 
reactive routing protocol, discovering routes only when they 
are needed. “It offers quick adaptation to dynamic link 
conditions, low processing and memory overhead, low 
network utilization, and determines unicast routes to 
destinations within ad hoc network". Three main messages in 
AODV: Route Request (RREQ), Route Reply (RREP), and 
Route Error (RERR) messages. When a node wants to 
communicate with another node in the network and does not 
have a fresh route for destination, it broadcasting a RREQ 
message.  Intermediate nodes that receive this request either 
send a RREP to the source node if they have a fresh route to 
the destination node and the \”destination\ only" flag is not 
set, or forward the RREQ message to other nodes. If the 
request packet has been previously forwarded by this 
Intermediate node, it is silently dropped. When the destination 
node receives a RREQ for itself, it sends back a RREP 
message on the reverse route. 
3.2  Attacks on AODV: 
The three attacks (targeting at AODV) whose detection is the 
subject of this paper are introduced below. 
 Dropping Attack 
 Ad Hoc Flooding Attack 
 Route Disruption Attack 
Dropping Attack: In a dropping attack malicious node(s) 
drop data packets not destined for themselves with the aim of 
disrupting the network connection. Selfish nodes also drop 
data packets not destined for themselves to preserve their 
resources. Dropping attacks result in reduced network 
performance by causing the retransmission of data packets. 
AdHoc Flooding Attack: In Adhoc flooding attack the 
attacker exploits property of link breakages and the route 
discovery mechanism by broadcasting a lot of route request 
messages for randomly selected nodes. The attacker aims to 
consume the resources of the nodes and the network. We 
believe that high mobility makes it difficult to distinguish a 
flooding attack from benign behavior on a network, since it 
may also cause a high number of route request packets in the 
network. In the simulation, the attacker broadcasts 20 route 
request packets in a row as in. 
Council for Innovative Research                                                              International Journal of Computers & Technology 
www.cirworld.com                                                                                                               Volume 3 No. 3, Nov-Dec, 2012 
352 | P a g e                                                    w w w . i j c t o n l i n e . c o m  
 
Route Disruption Attack: In a route disruption attack, the 
attacker sends route reply messages to the victim node 
without receiving any route request messages. There is no 
mechanism that checks route request-reply flow in AODV. 
Even nodes overhearing a route reply message can update 
their routing tables if the message carries a fresh route. 
Instead of sending route replies for random destination nodes, 
the attacker chooses one of its neighbors as a victim. Since the 
attacker is the victim node's neighbor, he already knows about 
the active routes of the victim through the routing. The 
attacker sends fresh route reply messages (with higher 
destination sequence numbers) to this node. Since the route 
reply messages sent by the attacker are fresher, the victim 
node updates his routing table with the routes that the attacker 
advertises. Hence the attacker is able to disrupt the victim's 
active routes and puts himself into the victim's routes. As 
stated in [89], one or just a few routing control packets could 
hardly impose severe damage to the system. So, in the 
simulation the attacker sends 5-10 route reply packets to the 
victim in a time interval (a second). This attack has been 
extended to 3 and 5 seconds in further simulations where the 
attacker achieves his goal slowly and makes the detection of 
his malicious behaviour difficult. 
4. EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 
Evolutionary Computation (EC) is a research area inspired by 
natural evolution. It is loosely based on the process of 
Darwinian survival of the fittest, where individuals are 
competing with each other for survival and reproduction in an 
environment that can only host limited number of individuals. 
Evolutionary computation uses this approach to create 
computer programs for a given problem automatically, where 
candidate solutions of the problem correspond to the 
individuals, and the best programs correspond to the fittest 
individuals in a population in natural evolution. The pseudo 
code of the general steps in evolutionary computation is given 
below. 
Initialize population 
While termination criterion not satisfied do 
Execute and evaluate fitness value of each individual 
Apply genetic operators (selection, crossover, mutation, etc.) 
to the individuals 
Create new population 
End while 
Return best-of-run individual 
EC starts with generating a population of individuals (usually 
randomly) which are candidate solutions for the target 
problem. Each individual is evaluated and assigned a fitness 
value that indicates how well this candidate solves the 
problem at hand. Until a termination criterion is satisfied, new 
populations are generated iteratively by using selection, 
crossover, and mutation operators as in natural evolution.  
The main components of an evolutionary algorithm are 
outlined as follows: 
 Representation of Individuals 
 Fitness (Evaluation) Function 
 Initialization 
 Selection Mechanism (Parent Selection) 
 Variation Operators 
 Replacement Mechanism (Survivor Selection) 
 Termination 
4.1Grammatical Evolution:"Grammatical 
Evolution is a system that can be used to automatically 
generate programs in any language".GE is not the first 
technique using grammars, But it present a unique way of 
using grammars in an evolution process. GE evolves 
programs written in a BNF grammar. BNF (Backus-Naur 
Form) is a formal way to describe a language by defining a set 
of rules. A BNF described as a quadruple:[ T, N, P, S]. T is a 
set of terminal symbols; N is a set of non-terminal symbols. P 
provides mapping from non-terminal symbols to sequences of 
terminal or non-terminal symbols. S is the start symbol where 
mapping starts. 
Initialization: GE utilizes sensible initialization to create the 
initial population. Sensible initialization is based on ramped 
half and half initialization in GP but generates derivation trees 
of equivalent size. 
Variation Operator: GE used one point crossover by default. 
In one-point crossover, two points are Selected on each parent 
randomly and their genetic contents are exchanged. In 
mutation operator point mutation which mutates each bit of a 
genome with a given probability is employed. It is possible 
that more than one bit making up a cordon value will be 
changed. 
 
Crossover Operator on Grammatical Evolution 
 
4.2 Simulation Model: 
In this paper the networks are simulated by ns-2  to evaluate 
the performance of evolved programs by using GE. In this 
model, each node moves from its current location to a random 
new location with random speed and pause time within 
determined speed/pause time limits. Different network 
scenarios are created with different mobility levels and traffic 
loads. The parameters of the network simulation are given in 
Table 5.1. 
Network 
Dimension 
1100 × 500 
Number of nodes 40 
Packet Traffic TCP with 25 and 30 Connections 
Speed 0-22 m/sec ,pause time 42, 20 , 5 sec to 
simulate low, medium and high 
mobility respectively 
Routing Protocol 
Radio Propagation 
AODV 
Two- ray ground model with 250m 
transmission range 
Local link 
connectivity 
AODV periodic Hello Message 
Simulation Time 550 sec(training), 2000 sec Testing 
4.3 Performance of Grammatical Evolution: 
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The GE algorithm is run ten times on the training data and the 
best result of ten runs is evaluated on simulated networks. 
Performance of the evolved program for each attack on the 
network with 25 TCP connections. The false positive rates on 
the same network under no attack and on the stable network 
(no mobility) are also evaluated. The false positive rates 
changes due to mobility and the traffic load. Other factor such 
as network topology, traffic and mobility pattern is also 
affecting the results. In Figure 5.1 the numbers of route 
request packets on a normal network and on a network under 
ad hoc flooding attack are presented. It shows little difference 
in the numbers of route request packets among the networks 
with different mobility levels. The network under 
low/medium mobility may also broadcast a lot of route 
request packets due to its topology, its mobility and traffic 
patterns to build and preserve its active routes.  
 
Fig: 5.1 Route Request Packets on Simulated Networks 
In the results given in Table 5.2 the false positive rate of the 
detection program for the ad hoc flooding attack on the stable 
network is higher than for the mobile network. Since the 
programs are evolved under medium mobility, this is quite 
expected. Furthermore lots of route request messages are 
noticed in the stable network. The nodes who cannot 
communicate with their destination nodes  broadcast route 
request messages frequently to find routes. As a consequence 
lots of route request packets under no mobility the system 
results in high false positive rate. 
Table: 5.2 The Performance of GE on a Network with 
Medium Mobility/Traffic 
Attack Detection False 
Positive 
False 
positive 
 Without 
attack 
(with 
Mobility) 
False 
Positive  
Without 
attack 
(No 
Mobility) 
Dropping 
Attack 
100% 8.50% 8.83% 10.35% 
Flooding 
Attack 
99.80% 2.2% 2.15% 5.10% 
Route 
Disruption 
99.20% 0.85% 0.80% 0.60% 
5. CONCLUSION:  
This paper investigates the use of evolutionary computation 
techniques, specifically GE to evolve intrusion detection 
programs for MANETs. Since MANETs have become the 
target of new attacks which exploit the cooperative nature of 
routing protocols, we have aimed to detect specific attacks 
targeting routing protocols. It is the first application of 
evolutionary computation to intrusion detection in MANETs. 
The performance of programs evolved using GE is evaluated 
on simulated networks with varying mobility and traffic 
patterns. Both techniques show a good performance for 
detecting ad hoc flooding and route disruption attacks. This 
paper consists of the detailed descriptions of how to apply 
evolutionary computation techniques to the detection of the 
following attacks: ad hoc flooding, route disruption (and its 
variations), and dropping attacks. 
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